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Introduction 
As a result of neo-liberal and structural adjustment policies, many developing 
countries are presently introducing participatory extension approaches in which 
issues of accountability and empowerment are paramount. Participatory 
approaches of this kind have been heralded by multilateral institutions such as 
the World Bank as key vehicles for improving the efficiency of state 
bureaucracies, for increasing farmers' self-reliance and for making state policies 
more sustainable, both in ecological and organisational terms. From a 
sociological perspective, it can be argued that the introduction of participatory 
extension approaches is an important element in the construction of new types of 
relations between farmers and the state for the constitution of new types of 
governance. 
This chapter sets out to critically analyse a number of normative assumptions 
underlying the concept of (good) governance currently employed by many social 
scientists working from an institutionalist perspective. To assist this analysis, I 
draw upon post-structuralist insights developed around Foucault's work on 
governance and on the actor-oriented approach developed in Wageningen under 
the direction of Norman Long. The argument, in short, is that the strength of the 
governance concept has been undermined by policy-oriented work aimed at 
developing prescriptions for 'good governance'. It is also argued that the 
governance approach could benefit from an ethnographic approach that pays 
^ closer attention to the social practices of situated actors. 
The chapter begins with a discussion on the concept of governance and 
proceeds with a case study of an extensionist working for an integrated rural 
development project in a colonisation area in the Atlantic Zone of Costa Rica. In 
the conclusion, a number of ideas about the possibilities of integrating 
institutionalist and actor-oriented approaches are presented. 
Some critical comments on the governance approach 
Governance has recently emerged as a powerful new concept in policy arenas 
and recent theoretical works about state intervention. In opposition to 
structuralist and instrumentalist views on the state, the governance concept 
moves away from the idea of the state as being the principal actor in designing 
and implementing policies and programmes. The practice of government is 
instead seen as the outcome of a complex set of interactions between different 
sets of actors. Kooiman (1993:258) thus defines governance as 'the pattern or 
structure that emerges in a social-political system as the "common " result or 
outcome of the interacting intervention efforts of all actors involved'. 
The governance approach has been developed as a policy framework for 
improving the effectiveness, efficiency and legitimacy of state interventions. 
Governance, in this view, can best be visualised in terms of polycentric 
institutional arrangements (Ostrom and Wynne, 1993: 177), the idea being that 
people's organisations are most effective when individuals organise themselves 
in groups in relation to single or multi-purpose authorities in particular areas. 
Such polycentric arrangements allow for an effective mix between local 
indigenous organisations, development organisations and state agencies. The 
state is viewed as but one actor within a larger constellation of organisations in 
which manifold contracting relationships can be established (public-private; 
donor-NGOs; government-NGOs; NGO-Community based organisations; CBO-
group/community). 
On the basis of these ideas, the notion of 'good governance' has become 
increasingly popular among multilateral institutions (see the World Bank State of 
the World Report 1998 dedicated to the state). In this policy context good 
governance embraces the state, the market and civil society as three different 
domains of activity, each with its own modes of regulation, set of resources and 
practices. It also refers to a set of rules and norms that regulate the inter-relations 
between these domains in a transparent and accountable way. Hence, the role of 
the state, rather than being the prime agent of development, is viewed as creating 
an environment in which the market can regulate economic activity, and where 
civil society can enable citizens to organise themselves through democratic and 
transparent organisational forms. 
The good governance perspective can be criticised on several grounds. To 
begin with, the notions employed (accountability and transparency) are not so 
much analytical concepts that can aid research into the intricacies of 
administrative and political relations that, by nature, involve a wide range of 
actors. They are normative concepts contrived by policy-makers. As Long 
argues, 
'One must avoid accepting uncritically the definitions and assumptions of 
administrators, planners and politicians. [For] the life-worlds of farmers and other 
actors are not confined to the spatial and strategic options promoted by policy-
makers even when these conceptions acquire a "reality" as powerful instruments for 
allocating resources and for defining the discourse of policy and analysis' (Long, 
1997: 53; see also Long 1988, 1989). 
Thus, if we take the actors' points of view seriously, we should not give 
preference to any particular set of actors (in this case, policy-makers and 
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politicians). Furthermore, articles of faith and good intentions should not be 
confused with real-life programmes of action and their outcomes. 
Instead of working with a policy-framework, we need to develop an analytical 
conceptualisation of governance that enables us to assess and analyse current 
changes in relationships between farmers, state and non-state institutions. It also 
needs to analyse the roles played by the idioms and vocabularies of policy-
makers in shaping such relationships. To do this, we can draw upon ideas 
developed by post-structuralists on policy-discourse in order to criticise three 
notions central to the concept of (good) governance as developed in policy 
circles: transparency, civil society and accountability. 
To begin with, the notion of transparency is problematic since it conceals the 
fact that relations between policy-makers, politicians and administrators involve 
multiple hidden agendas (Schaffer, 1984). These hidden agendas are sometimes 
well established but often still in formulation. Transparency conveys the idea that 
it is possible to design clear-cut rules and procedures for organisational processes 
with an optimal degree of openness. These assumptions run counter to the 
! (observation that administrative activities involve the emergence of certain 
jpragmatic rules of the game (Bailey, 1969) and forms of practical or tacit 
.'knowledge (Giddens, 1984), which resist being made explicit because they are 
inherently political activities. We therefore need to problematise such normative 
constructions and view them as elements within policy discourses deployed by 
policy-makers and administrators for specific purposes (Apthorpe and Gasper, 
1996; de Vries, 1997; Grillo, 1997). Furthermore, it can be argued that the notion 
of transparency is but one of a battery of elements within a wider development 
apparatus (Escobar, 1995; Ferguson, 1990) aimed at constructing defined 
visibility through a bureaucratic/institutional optic. Accordingly, in post-
structuralist theory transparency is viewed as a discursive technique for opening 
up a space for intervention in hitherto 'inaccessible' domains of administrative 
life, hence creating new domains of intervention. 
The conceptualisation of a domain of socio-political activity separate from 
those of the state and the market is also central to notions of good governance. 
Such a notion of civil society assumes that society is composed of organised 
individuals and groups who define their interests and commitments as being 
distinct from that of the state and, accordingly, organise themselves 
'autonomously'. Reality, however, is more complex; people organise themselves 
within a multitude of different domains (the family, community organisations, 
business enterprises, etc.) constituting defined fields of activity which are 
underpinned by certain moral notions or values. The artificial separation between 
state, market and civil society obscures the existence of organising practices 
which cross-cut the family, community and entrepreneurial domains that enable 
people to access and combine different sets of material and authoritative 
resources. 
Finally, accountability is a problematic concept since it assumes the existence 
and possibility of defining a generalised/universal set of moral standards 
concerning 'good' administration. The point is not so much the lack of 
mechanisms for holding bureaucracies accountable for their actions, but the fact 
\ that these are embedded in idioms, power relations, moralities and practices 
which are culturally specific and context dependent. Rather than a fixed set of 
rules and norms, accountability should be seen as tied to particular performances 
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and settings, such as when farmers make jokes about the incapacity of officials to 
make good on their promises, thus representing the enactment of forms of 
popular culture which ridicule authorities (Scott, 1985). Again, from a post-
structuralist perspective, accountability can be viewed as an element of policy 
discourses constituting what Foucault, coining a neologism, has denominated 
''governmentality'' (Burchell, 1991; Miller and Rose, 1992). Accountability, then, 
can be viewed as a set of (discursive and non-discursive) techniques aimed at 
^ instilling forms of calculation among often distant actors, thus enabling the 
exercise of power from a distance (Latour, 1987). The engendering of forms of 
accountability, in this view, is another set of practices by administrators aimed 
towards rendering the world calculable and predictable by developing modes for 
governing the conduct of others (Miller and Rose, 1992). 
Indeed, the work of Foucault and his followers on technologies of government 
is useful for researching and analysing the deployment, uses and effects of the 
discourse and practices of participatory extension methodologies. However, we 
should not assume that policy-makers are able to impose their agendas on 
'distant' actors such as extensionists and farmers through the construction and 
manipulation of policy discourses. As Long (1997: 54) argues, it is necessary to 
complement the post-structuralist approach with a detailed examination of how 
discourses are deployed in particular social arenas, and by giving more attention 
. to issues of strategy and social life. For these reasons, it is important that a 
methodology is developed for studying social interactions between bureaucrats 
and farmers by focussing on the encounters that take place between them in 
various types of social settings. Accordingly, an analytical conceptualisation of 
governance should concentrate on the construction of accountabilities and 
moralities both as a result of the deployment and appropriation of policy 
discourses by different sets of actors and as emergent properties of social 
interaction between bureaucrats and farmers. 
These ideas are explored further with the use of an ethnographic case study 
concentrating on the social production of moral notions of the 'good 
extensionist' or the 'good farmer'. The case study also focuses on the production 
of languages of accountability, whereby bureaucrats and farmers evaluate and 
assess government programmes and the roles of the various parties involved. The 
case study demonstrates that such languages of accountability evince mixtures of 
technocratic policy discourse, focussing on both the skills necessary for 
rendering financial accounts, and on popular notions and images of social justice. 
In 1988-1990, research administrated by the Costa Rican Land Reform 
Institute (IDA) was conducted in a settlement area (the Neguev Regional Office) 
in the Atlantic Zone of Costa Rica. Before becoming a settlement Neguev had 
been a cattle ranch until 1978, when it was invaded by a radical peasant 
organisation (UPAGRA). After a couple of years of struggle it was purchased by 
the IDA, which embarked on an ambitious programme to convert peasants and 
plantation workers into entrepreneurial farmers through the implementation of an 
integrated rural development project. Not surprisingly, the project was a massive 
failure because of 'implementation problems' and the difficulties of putting into 
place an effective 'beneficiary selection system' (de Vries, 1997). 
The style of intervention used in the project was most definitely top-down, if 
not outright repressive. I documented the trajectory of the project interventions in 
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a previous article (de Vries, 1995) by focussing on a series of interfaces or 
critical encounters between settler-beneficiaries and IDA front-line workers 
(extensionists, social workers, land-measurers etc). In the article in question, I set 
out to show how the life-world of one 'exemplary' extensionist was shaped by a 
particular technocratic discourse. The discourse was aimed at enhancing 
institutional performance through the introduction of transparent working 
procedures (such as a computerised beneficiary selection system); hence 
minimising the role of clientelistic relations in IDA's functioning. This 
discourse, however, was appropriated in different ways by institutional 
managers, regional administrators and the front-line workers in the settlements, 
giving rise at the local level to highly demeaning and even racist views on the 
settler population. I argued that the conflictive and contradictory character of the 
technocratic discourse was reflected in what I call the 'fragmented nature' of this 
exemplary extensionist's life-world. This had distinct implications for the way in 
which he developed a code of conduct (or style of operation) for dealing with 
settlers, colleagues and the institution at large. 
Although the research predates the introduction of participatory methodologies 
in Costa Rica in the 1990's, it can be argued that present relations between 
extensionists and settlers do not differ substantially from those recorded ten 
years ago. In fact, as Pacheco (2000) and Zuniga (1998) show, participatory 
methodologies of this nature have had little effect in terms of their intended 
objectives i.e. improving the quality of communication with a view to enabling 
forms of local-level planning that make possible a more efficient use of scarce 
resources. On the contrary, the introduction of these methodologies imposed an 
additional administrative burden for the extensionists, rendering them even more 
dependent on entrepreneurial actors than before. Subsequently, the use of 
participatory methodologies in the Ministry of Agriculture has recently been 
discontinued in view of their lack of effectiveness. 
A case study of an exemplary técnico 
At the time of my research, Samuel was one of ten field-level workers 
representing the Neguev regional office and was in charge of the medicinal 
plants and pineapple programmes. He comes from San Vito; a coffee producing 
area in the southern part of the country regarded as being one of the few 
successful attempts to promote colonisation by Europeans in Costa Rica. His 
father was a small coffee farmer and cattle holder in this same region. Given this 
background, Samuel preferred to define himself as a campesino. His background, 
he would argue, was the main reason he preferred to work in the field with 
smallholders than in the office. Most of the satisfaction he derived from his work 
came from the appreciation he received from the farmers he worked alongside 
of. 
Samuel was employed at the IDA headquarters in San José and sent to Neguev 
for the explicit purpose of establishing medicinal plants, spices and dyes 
programme. This programme, Samuel's first, was initiated in 1982-83 by Alberto 
Ramos, a former university lecturer of his, who had become the IDA expert in 
charge of the national medicinal plants programme. 
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Samuel had done practical work under supervision of Ramos in two Indian 
reserves in his native province during his studies. Before this, they had 
collaborated with each other on laboratory work on medicinal plants at the 
national museum and have continued to maintain very close working relations 
ever since. 
In the Indian reserves, Samuel dedicated himself to collecting and classifying 
medicinal plants on the basis of the Indians' own indigenous knowledge. He 
spent fifteen days in each Indian community living with an Indian family. This 
was an important experience for him and he recalled that, 
' These people are highly reserved and if you want to gain their confidence you have 
to make a lot of effort. Yet, ultimately I developed a deep appreciation of them and I 
think they also valued my work'. 
After Samuel graduated from the university, Alberto Ramos made arrangements 
to get him a job on his medicinal plant programme. This, however, proved to be 
very difficult and they had to wait until someone known to them was appointed 
to the Board of Directors before getting the necessary support. He was finally 
transferred to Neguev in 1984 where he set out to select all the plants with 
medicinal properties from the area in order to establish a demonstration plot. As 
he recalled, 'I started to relate to the plants, for I did not know much about them 
in this area. I had to detect them and learn their names, the scientific and 
popular ones'. 
Samuel and Alberto planned to promote the cultivation of medicinal plants for 
commercial purposes and had developed connections with a Swiss exporter. 
After some time they had a variety of plants and were experimenting with 
various planting distances, stalks per station and so on. They had also acquired a 
plant dryer. Samuel began to look for settlers willing to grow these plants. In the 
beginning it was decided to work with four different settlers, each on a half-
hectare plot with five different plant species. But problems began to surface as 
soon as the plants were ready to be collected. The dryer could not cope with the 
large volumes produced and it appeared that the Swiss exporter suddenly did not 
have the connections required for exporting the plants. He was convinced that 
there was a large international market for the plants but he had underestimated 
how difficult it was to enter it. In Samuel's opinion, a court case could have been 
taken up and won against the exporter but it was hardly worth the effort. This 
was a bitter experience for him: 'My conscience said to me that I had to find a 
way of getting rid of the plant material while paying the farmers for it. Otherwise 
I would lose their trust' he recalls. In the end he decided to buy the plants 
himself: 'I had established friendship relations with several settlers and I knew 
that they would be very disappointed in me if I told them that there was no 
market for the plants'. In fact, he paid the farmers the prices agreed to with 
money he that borrowed himself, incurring a heavy financial loss in the process. 
This, it must be said, illustrates a very rare example of an extensionist assuming 
responsibility for programme failure. In a more typical situation, the settlers 
would have been blamed for such a failure, accused of 'ignorance', laziness' or 
the inability to follow their instructions. 
From then on, Samuel decided to place more emphasis on the social function 
of the programme by providing home-grown medicines and preventative herbs 
(against headaches, nervous illness, etc.) for the farmers and their families. He 
planned the programme so that it would incorporate a number of educational 
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activities, and settlers were offered the plants for free. Altogether some sixty 
gardens were established in the settlement, including a communal garden set-up 
for settlers to examine and choose the plants they wanted. There were also 
various field days (dias de campo) organised and gardens were established on the 
school grounds in collaboration with the teachers. It was hoped that they would 
explain to the children the various uses of plants and that the latter would take 
them home. In fact, the teachers also ended up playing an important role in 
approaching settlers who were interested in the programme. 
In this way, Samuel became well known in the community and established 
working relationships with numerous settlers. Although some efforts were made 
to find a commercial market, a reliable exporter could not be found and many 
lost interest due to the absence of a commercial outlet. After a while the demand 
for the plants began to decrease sharply and only a minority of the settlers 
continued with the programme. The medicinal programme came to a standstill 
not long after, when he became more involved in other crop programmes. 
Despite its apparent failure, Samuel nevertheless was of the opinion that some 
success had been achieved with the programme. One settler in Milano, for 
instance, had created an income for himself by raising four hectares of oregano 
and selling it at the producers' market in San José. The same settler also provided 
medicinal plants to UP AGRA, who organised a festival during which the women 
with the most beautiful gardens were awarded prizes. Samuel proudly asserted 
that all of the material came originated from one of his demonstration plots. It 
had nevertheless become clear to him that men were predominantly interested in 
commercial programmes. In this way, Samuel had discerned the different 
underlying interests between women and men with regard to livelihood 
strategies. As he put it, 
'with men you have to talk in Colones - the Costa Rican currency - because they are 
mostly interested in money. Women are more interested in family affairs, cheap 
medicines, and the opportunity to have a small additional income. The medicinal 
plants programme demanded a lot of work, and men were not going to provide it if 
the monetary reward did not correspond to the amount of labour they expended. ' 
He had also had problems in other settlements with the women's groups that 
were assisted by the 'women and development' section of the IDA. The social 
workers had promised them good profits in a short time, if only they would 
organise themselves properly. Although the quantities produced were small 
enough to sell in one of the regional markets, the plants required careful selection 
to provide a good product. Once Alberto Ramos and Samuel were accused of 
deceiving the women after the produce fetched a much lower price than had been 
expected. Marketing, Samuel pointed out, was a profession in itself, and he 
admitted that in their enthusiasm they had made the error of suggesting to the 
women that the main difficulty was that of growing the plants. Indeed, he 
recognised that he had been too paternalistic in his relations with settlers. The 
main lesson of this experience for him was that production and marketing 
problems could not be resolved by extensionists alone. It would require close co-
operation between extensionists and their beneficiaries. 
The Chilli Programme 
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After the not so positive experience of the medicinal plants scheme came the 
chilli programme. Samuel was convinced that the only way to solve the 
livelihood problems of the settlers was by developing a mix of profitable cash 
crops that were suited to smallholder cultivation. From the outset he had been 
looking for a spice that would attract the commitment of a wider group of 
farmers, but he could not find anything which combined good market 
possibilities with existing agronomic conditions. 
His choice for the red pepper - or chilli - came by chance. A settler once 
mentioned to him that he was thinking of cultivating chilli. He told Samuel that 
close to Pocora some farmers had been growing it and had had no difficulty in 
selling it. This interested him greatly so he went to Pocora where he inspected a 
few plots and talked to the purchasers. He also spoke with the manager of a 
processing company, Kamouk. It appeared that the manager was a very open 
person and they immediately got along well. On that same occasion they talked 
of a possible production area of fifty hectares. Later, they reduced the planned 
area to twenty-five hectares, in view of the high yields that they expected. 
There was not much available data on the hot chilli, as only ASBANA - the 
National Association of Banana Producers - had been doing research on it. With 
the help of information that was provided by the Chilli growers Samuel had met, 
he made a cost calculation (avio) which he presented to the Credit Fund. He had 
a good relationship with functionaries from the Fund in San José, and they 
decided to extend credit for the programme. Subsequently he initiated the search 
for possible programme beneficiaries. As he recalled: 
'First I talked to settlers I knew from the medicinal plants programme, but there was 
not much interest. Then I made lists of the best farmers with the help of two other 
técnicos. On the basis ofthat list I succeeded in finding twenty five beneficiaries'. 
However, many settlers still had lingering doubts. Chilli was a new and relatively 
unknown crop in the area and all other previous programmes had been failures. 
Consequently, some of the farmers decided to plant only half a hectare, which 
meant that only seventeen of the targeted twenty-five hectares was reached. In 
any case, there was much distrust amongst the farmers. The first credit delivery, 
for example, was not accepted by the settlers because they wanted to have more 
information. Ultimately, however, they fared very well. As Samuel recalled, 
'Much better than any of us would have dreamed. In fact, I would have already been 
relieved if it had not become another failure. In fact, this was the first really 
successful programme in the settlement and some beneficiaries made a profit of as 
much as 600 thousand colories. ' 
Samuel calculated that altogether it had made the settlement seven to eight 
million colones richer. This of course had significant consequences for him. As 
he said, 
'Since then the roles changed and instead of me pursuing them, settlers would start 
asking me if they could participate in the programme. But the market was restricted 
and I could not include any more beneficiaries. ' 
A major advantage of red peppers is that they grow on infertile soils, provided 
the drainage is good. However, they are not well suited to humid tropical areas 
since they are highly vulnerable to a fungus called malla, which as yet cannot be 
controlled. It would only be question of time before malla arrived, after which 
chilli would not be able to be grown for at least three years without being 
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affected by traces residing in the soil. Samuel realised that sooner or later the 
plantations would be affected by this illness. Chilli, then, was a transitional crop. 
It offered many the opportunities to make a quick profit but would not provide a 
long-term alternative to the production and marketing problem. 
Early successes saw the number of chilli cultivators expand to forty-two across 
the entire settlement, with many farmers financing their own chilli. However, 
Samuel gave preference to settlers in the poorest settlement sectors. Indeed, he 
claimed that he was in search of profitable alternatives for those areas in the 
settlement with the poorest soils. Furthermore, Samuel adopted a careful attitude 
towards credit, not providing new chilli cultivators with credit because of the 
risks incurred by the spread of malla. 
He continued his search for a longer-term solution and eventually 'discovered' 
maracuya (custard apple). Again, it was the suggestion of a settler who told him 
that fairly large plots of custard apple were being planted in the area of Sarapiqui 
that led him to this. He promptly went to the area to investigate. At the National 
Bank of the village of San Miguel he obtained a cost projection that had been 
made for a few producers who were cultivating maracuya with bank credit. 
Maracuya, he decided, had the same favourable characteristics as chilli in that it 
provided a regular monthly income but more importantly, it was better adapted 
to the Atlantic Zone. 
Relationships with settlers 
Samuel, like the other officials, was selective with regard to the people he 
worked with, although he claimed that he got along with the majority and had 
had bad relationships with only two or three. He recounted a nasty experience 
with a really 'difficult settler' (problemàtico), Norberte Casas. He described him 
in the following way, 
'There is in El Silencio (one of the sectors of the Neguev settlement) a farmer called 
Norberto Casas, who is terrible. He criticises everything, he gossips with you about 
other officials and with them he gossips about you. He also spreads stories about his 
neighbours and then when you visit them you feel uncomfortable. Since he is an 
older man he thinks he knows everything better than us kids. First I had problems 
with him because he did not want to follow my recommendations. He even diverted 
the credit. Once I gave him money to buy inputs and he pocketed it. Then I wrote a 
really harsh note to him (bien chivaj with a copy to the Credit Fund in which I made 
clear to him that given the fact that he was diverting credit and that he gossiped 
about me and about other técnicos I could not continue assisting him. I had already 
given him a lot of credit, about sixty thousand. I talk to him only if it is absolutely 
necessary. I attempt not to have any kind of involvement with him'. 
In his view, issues like this concerning the trust relationships between técnico 
and farmer cannot be taken into consideration in programme design, and this 
makes extension practice much more complex in reality than it is on paper. He 
would argue, 
'That is the problem with these programmes of technological transfer. You can 
design a technological package but you cannot change the farmer. How are you 
going to change the customs of someone who has been tilling the land for twenty-five 
years? In the end extension amounts to a matter of personal relationships. ' 
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The issue of control was important to him in trust relationships. He therefore 
found it easier to work with new crops, unknown to the farmer and requiring 
modern technology. When comparing maize with chilli for example, he would 
argue that settlers have extensive knowledge of maize but they were forced to 
listen more to the técnico when it came to chilli. It was then easier to wield 
control over the application of a technological package with a crop like chilli. 
Trust between him and the farmer was in his view essential to his work. Trust, 
however, was not merely intuitive but something that could be tested on the 
farmer. Before going to the field, for example, Samuel always reviewed a file 
with recommendations and notes that he had made about the settlers he was 
going to visit. Trust for him was something that should be validated on the basis 
of real progress. It was not merely based on friendship or sympathy. It was just 
as much based the confidence the farmer has in the técnico and vice-versa. In 
elaborating upon this theme Samuel commented, 
' With settlers I usually have a good relationship. Yet I always keep a distance. That 
is my nature. It takes time before I trust them. That has nothing to do with the fact 
that I am a técnico and they supposedly peasants. For, neither do I have 
relationships of friendship with the other técnicos' 
And in talking about them he said, 
' They are colleagues /companerosy. But to say that they are friends, well I do not 
know what your concept of friendship is... to have a friend, I consider, is like having 
a brother. You must have a lot of confianza [confidence]. I would say that here I do 
not have real friends, but there is certainly a feeling of friendship among us. ' 
Establishing a friendship with a settler was problematic in his view, since it 
could give rise to situations that should not occur in a relationship between a 
farmer and a técnico, such as displays of disrespect. Yet, he was clear in arguing 
that, 'in essence it does not matter to me that they are farmers. I have been a 
farmer myself for a long time. Friendship after all is a personal relationship, it is 
subjective'. These remarks reveal a contrast between Samuel's attitude and that 
of the other técnicos, who were accustomed to making displays of friendship 
with settlers, often characterised by jokes and by not taking things too seriously. 
Samuel's attitude was more concerned with establishing relations with settlers 
based on mutual respect, confidence and trust. 
He had once had a disappointing experience with a settler, who he had 
included in the chilli programme and whom he considered as someone who 
could play an important role as a local leader. The settler in question ended up 
diverting credit for other uses. 'Actually', he argued, 'I like him as a person, but 
that does not conceal that I am disillusioned'. On the other hand, there were 
settlers he did not trust initially but for whom he gained much appreciation in the 
course of his work. As he put it, 'in the course of a relationship you learn things 
from them and often you have experiences that are not pleasant at all'. 
Trust as the basis for a working relationship, and for a possible friendship, did 
not in his view form an excuse for unjust or politically oriented criticism. One 
experience he had with an UP AGRA leader attests to this. During a visit made to 
Neguev by some técnicos from an agro-processing company to provide 
information on non-traditional export crops, one UP AGRA sympathiser began a 
tirade of criticism against the IDA, pointing out what he saw as the political 
function of production programmes. Samuel recalls this as a very unpleasant 
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experience, especially since it took place in front of an outsider. In his opinion 
'dirty linen should be washed at home'. Another radical leader, on that occasion, 
congratulated him for his commitment and called him the first técnico in the 
settlement who showed that he was ready to share his knowledge with the 
peasants. Yet, he continued questioning him for not being able to take an 
independent stand vis-à-vis the local administration. As this radical settler put it, 
'Look, Samuel, you have shown that you are not afraid of establishing relationships 
with peasants and thereby to run risks. Why are you afraid to question the 
institution's policy of dividing the community? As a child you surely contradicted 
your mother, didn't you? Well, I think that an institution does not deserve more 
respect than your own mother'. 
In effect, Samuel had an ambiguous relationship with UP AGRA leaders. On the 
one hand he resented the fact that the IDA's Regional Director in the Atlantic 
Zone, had at various times stopped him from working with organised groups 
which were considered to be close to UP AGRA. The Regional Director had once 
forced Samuel to dispose of a truck full of medicinal plants that were to be 
delivered to such a group. On the other hand, Samuel had an ongoing conflict 
with a few of the peasant leaders who argued that he was neglecting the need to 
forge strong local organisations that could defend the producers' interests, and 
that his approach only benefited wealthier pro-IDA producers. Samuel, in fact, 
was very sensitive to these arguments, but he argued strongly against a political 
approach to the 'organisation' problem. Contrary to many of the radical peasant 
leaders, he was totally opposed to using the Association of Small Producers, 
essentially a farmers organisation, as a platform for dealing with social and 
political objectives related to community issues. He referred to the success of the 
coffee sector in Costa Rica, achieved through piecemeal but constant efforts at 
building strong organisations focused on production instead of politics. He did, 
however, take the view that a union such as UP AGRA should be given the 
opportunity to defend the interests of the peasants in a peaceful and collaborative 
way. It was a disappointment to him that many peasant leaders with highly 
developed organisational and rhetorical skills were not involved in the 
establishment of local organisations. He would bemoan the fact that many of 
these characters preferred to spend their time 'smoking marihuana and drinking' 
instead of working hard on their plots to repay their debts. 
Samuel's personal projects in relation to the bureaucracy 
I went to the field various times with Samuel, usually in his old jeep but a few 
times - when his car was being repaired -1 offered to drive him around. Samuel 
was quite open about his view of the institute and about his personal projects. He 
also liked to reflect on the deceptions and tensions that working with 
smallholders entailed, on the political underpinnings of administrative life and on 
his aspiration to be paid in accordance with his professional abilities and 
dedication. He repeatedly asserted that he had little aspiration to ascend within 
the institute. A major reason for that was that he did not like office work. In 
addition, he dreaded the kind of political struggles an institute's manager had to 
become involved in to maintain himself in that position. Moreover, he was 
thinking of cutting his ties with the IDA because of the low salaries that were 
paid. He was even considering going independent and providing extension to 
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producers on a private basis. He was emphatic in his belief that the only 
incentive he had received till now was the gratitude of smallholders. He had 
received little recognition from the administration and once made the comment 
that taking initiatives in an institution provided no rewards, only risks. 'If the 
chilli programme had been a failure, everyone would have blamed me. And the 
same holds for the new programmes I am involved in'. 
Discussion: operational styles and governance 
It is remarkable that although Samuel has been considered by farmers, colleagues 
and his superiors alike as an exemplary extensionist, he has not been very 
successful in his professional career in the IDA. One reason for this is that he has 
spent too much time with the farmers and is too committed to them. Although he 
has been viewed as a good and dependable colleague, he is also considered an 
odd one: someone who cannot be counted on in a political conflict. He has a 
dislike of politics and therefore has not been able to develop a network of friends 
within the institution. With the exception of the relationship with his former 
teacher, he has no protectors at higher levels. 
On the other hand, his relationships with the farmers are not devoid of 
difficulties either. Most farmers would consider him as being the best and only 
responsible extensionist in the regional office but many have accused him of 
working only with farmers he likes. In the light of his past experiences with 
'difficult' settlers and the prohibitions imposed upon him by regional 
administrators about working with organised groups (for fear these may be 
infiltrated by 'radical peasant leaders'), he has decided to develop very personal 
relationships of trust with selected settlers. The notion of trust is central to his 
style of operation but it is a trust that is not simply given away. Trust, as Samuel 
defines it, is subject to continuous re-assessment. His caution here is the result of 
having been deceived, more than once, by farmers he thought he could trust. He 
accounts for this lack of trustworthiness by referring to the 'special character' of 
farmers in the Atlantic Zone 'who are so different from those in my area of 
origin". 
His relationship with 'radical UP AGRA leaders', though personally friendly, 
has also been characterised by a degree of distrust and lack of confidence. 
Although he appreciates their organisational capacities, he believes they should 
concentrate more on becoming good farmers instead of engaging in political 
activity. His reply to leaders claims that the institution has, for political reasons, 
set out to destroy their efforts to establish peasant producers' organisations, is 
that they should seek a constructive type of relationship with the IDA 
administration instead of the current conflictive approach. 
To round off this discussion, I would pose the following question. What can a 
focus on this extensionist's style of operation and life-world tell us about 'the 
construction of accountabilities and moralities' as defining features of patterns of 
governance? To begin with it is clear that Samuel's life-world has not been 
confined to the spatial and strategic options promoted by policy-makers, even 
though these options did acquire a 'reality' of their own at settlement level as 
'powerful instruments for allocating resources'. Samuel, though apparently 
complying with the project's technocratic policy discourse, did not adhere to 
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them in principle and strongly relied upon his previous experiences in his native 
area when dealing with settlers. Although he did adopt the official discourse of 
labelling settlers in the Atlantic Zone as troublesome, in practice he established 
very personal working relationships with individual settlers. 
Accordingly, institutional performance cannot be understood solely in terms of 
the 'the deployment and appropriation of policy discourses by different sets of 
actors' for there are various extra-institutional factors that affect relationships 
between front-line workers (such as extensionists) and farmers. In Samuel's case, 
we see that although he was constrained by IDA policy in his attempts to 
establish working relations with the settler population at large, he still managed 
to find room to manoeuvre in establishing effective networks for determined 
crop programmes. These networks, in fact, can be seen as the emergent 
properties of the social interaction between a farmer and a group of farmers. 
Finally, what implications does this analysis have for the notion of 
governance, and in particular, for the possibilities of integrating institutionalist 
and actor-oriented approaches? In my view, policy and analytical models such as 
governance should be treated as rough approximations of a reality as imagined 
by policy-makers and researchers. This does not imply that these models are 
false in the sense that they fail to represent real life correctly. They are, however, 
coloured by the professional and analytical interests of those who busy 
themselves in fashioning them. It follows then, that although influencing the way 
in which policy-makers design policies, the assumptions held by governance 
models about the separate existence of the market, civil society and state 
domains are highly questionable. 
To conclude with, I would argue that policy and analytical models are highly 
consequential in shaping social interactions between different sets of actors in 
ways that are not predicted by the models themselves. These patterns of social 
interaction, as I have suggested, have emergent properties that in turn reveal the 
simplified character of policy/analytical models. An actor-oriented approach, 
then, can document and analyse the mutually constitutive relationship between 
these policy/analytical models and defined patterns of social interaction. 
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